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AUTOMOBILE LAW

SHOULD PUNITIVE DAMAGES BE ABOLISHED?A STATEMENT FOR THE AFFIRMATIVE
By
JAMES D. GHIIARDI

Milwaukee, Wisconsin
The idea is wrong. It is a monstrous heresy. It is an unsightly and unhealthy excretion, deforming the symmetry and body of the law.,

Thus spoke the venerable Justice Foster of the New Hampshire
Supreme Court over ninety years ago in an attempt to rid punitive
damages from his state's jurisprudence. Unfortunately, however, that
landmark opinion is noted today more for its prodigiously scholarly
analysis of the origin and development of the concept of punitive
damages, and for its lyrical language, than for successful leadership in
the revolt against the "monstrous heresy." Despite nearly uniform con3
demnation by scholars,- and in spite of criticism from many courts,
all states but four' allow "punitive," "vindictive," "smart," or "exemplary"
damages to be awarded by a civil jury, over and above compensation for
every conceivable form of actual damage suffered by the plaintiff.
Because of the dubious basis for punitive damages, the controversy
surrounding this doctrine has never dulled. Recent developments in the
tort field have intensified efforts to purge this type of award from
American law.
VARIOUSLY DESCRIBED

Punitive damages are generally defined as damages which are given
in enhancement of ordinary or compensatory damages on the basis of
the wanton, reckless, malicious, or oppressive character of the acts of
defendant. These damages awarded to the plaintiff go beyond the actual
damages suffered by him. For that reason they have been described
as "speculative," "imaginary," "presumptive," or "added" damages.5
'Faye v. Parker, 53 N.H. 323, 382, 16 Am. Rep. 270, 320 (1873).
2 See Hale, Damages, secs. 87, 88 (2d ed. 1912); Willis, "Measure of Damages
When Property is Wrongfully Taken By a Private Individual," 22 Harv. L. Rev. 419
(1909); 2 Greenleaf, Evidence, sec. 253, p. 250 n. 2 (15th ed. 1892).
3 See Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582 (1878); Boetcher v.
Staples, 27 Minn. 308, 7 N.W. 263 (1880); Stewart v. Maddox, 63 Ind. 51 (1878);
and Faye v. Parker, supra note 1.
4 Louisiana: Vincent v. Morgan La. & Tex. R. R., 140 La. 1027, 74 So. 541 (1917);
Trenchard v. Central Laundry, 154 La. 1003, 98 So. 558 (1923); Massachusetts:
Burt v. Advertiser Newspaper Co., 154 Mass. 238, 28 N.E. 1 (1891); Boott Mills
v. Boston R. R., 218 Mass. 582, 106 N.E. 680 (1940); Nebraska: Boyer v. Barr,
8 Neb. 68 (1878); Reeve v. McCormick, 11 Neb. 261, 9 N.W. 88 (1881); Abel v.
Conover, 170 Neb. 926, 104 N.W.2d 684 (1960); and Washington: Spokane Truck
& Dray Co. v. Hoeter, 2 Wash. 45, 25 Pac. 1072 (1891).
5 15 Am. Jur. Damages sec. 265, p. 699 (1962).
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TO THE CIVIL LAW

Exemplary damages are indigenous only to the Common Law of the
English speaking countries and are unknown to the Civil Law, that
body of laws based upon the Napoleonic Code and in force on the
European continent.'
CONFLICTING THEORIES AS TO ORIGIN

-Various theories are proposed as to the origin of the doctrine of punitive damages. One is that it grew out of the refusal of courts to grant new
trials on account of excessive damages in cases where the injury was attended with malice, oppression, gross fraud, or negligence., Another
theory is that the doctrine arose because of a failure by the courts to
recognize many things which ought to be classed as injuries and which
should enter into a proper measurement of damages." Decisions have
stated that the doctrine was developed as a means of reimbursing the
plaintiff for elements of damage which were not legally compensable,
such as his wounded feelings or the expenses of suit. 9
Now RATIONALIZED AS PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENT
Today, most jurisdictions allow exemplary damages on the rationale
of punishing the defendant and of giving him a warning and example
to deter him and others from committing like offenses in the future. 10 By
this theory such damages are allowed on grounds of public policy, not
as compensatory damages, but rather in addition to such damages."
However, a few states have held that exemplary damages are not
awarded by way of punishment to the defendant, but as compensation
for the wrong suffered, although
incidentally they may, and do, operate
by way of punishment)
COURTS REGRET ADOPTION OF RULE

The concept of exemplary damages which was solidly entrenched in
early English law was brought over to this country and adopted as part
of the Common Law by most of the states here. Recognition of the
doctrine in the formative stage of American Law was steeped in controversy. Many courts later expressed regret that their state had adopted
such an anomalous rule.
"I have always regretted," stated Chief Justice Ryan of the Wisconsin
6 Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119, 46 Am. Rep. 366 (1884); and Faye
v. Parker, supra note 1. See Butterworth v. Butterworth [1920] Prob. (Eng.) 126,
10 B. R. C. 352.
7 Annotation, 12 Am. Rep. 199 (1912).
8 Stuart v. Western U. Teleg. Co., 66 Tex. 580, 18 S.W. 351, 59 Am. Rep. 623

(1885).
9 Faye v. Parker, supra note 1.
10 For cases in jurisdictions allowing punitive damages in one form or another,
see 15 Am. Jur. Damages sec. 266, p. 700 (1962).
11 Id. at p. 701.
12 Annotation, 16 A. L. R. 793 (1922).
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Supreme Court in 1877, "that this court adopted the rule of punitory
damages in actions of tort. In the controversy between Prof. Greenleaf
and Mr. Sedgwick, I cannot but think that the former was right
in princi" 13
ple, though the weight of authority may be with the latter.
Chief Justice Ryan explained the reasons underlying his objection to
the doctrine:
It is difficult on principle to understand why, when the sufferer by a tort
has been fully compensated for his suffering, he should recover anything
more. And it is equally difficult to understand why, if the tortfeasor is to be
punished by exemplary damages, they should go to the compensated
sufferer, and not to the public in whose behalf he is punished. The reasons
against punitory damages are peculiarly applicable in this state, since the
just and broad rule of compensatory damage sanctioned by this court. .... 14
COURTS LEFT CHANGE TO LEGISLATURE

As is the case with many of the antiquated rules of the Common Law
adopted by early courts, later courts felt that they had to follow the rule
of punitive damages regardless of the fact that it had outlived whatever
questionable purposes it had had. Statements of Chief Justice Ryan typify
such judicial attitudes. "But the rule [of punitive damages] was adopted
as long ago as 1854," he stated, "and has been repeatedly affirmed since.
It is therefore too late to overturn it by judicial decision. That could
well be done now by legislative enactment only."'15
The doctrine of punitive damages as a court rule does not, however,
require legislative reversal. In this light, consider the meritorious argument of Mr. Willis that "The doctrine is altogether inconsistent with
sound legal principles and it is unfortunate that it ever found lodgment
in the law, and we look with admiration upon any court brave enough
to disown and abandon it."'16 Courts which have overturned other long
established doctrines without legislative enactment should not hesitate
in this area. The trend to judicial abolishment of charitable, municipal
and parental immunity, the abrogation of defenses such as assumption
of risk and the abandonment of the "lex loci" theory in tort are vivid
examples of the authority of the court to act where the reason for the
rule no longer exists.
WINDFALL FOR PLAINTIFF

Courts generally agree that punitive damages are a windfall to the
13 Bass v. The Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co., 42 Wis. 654 (1877). For other
decisions criticizing the doctrine see: Murphy v. Hobbs, 7 Colo. 541, 5 Pac. 119,
49 Am. Rep. 366 (1884); Hanna v. Sweeny, 78 Conn. 492, 62 Atl. 785, 4 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 907 (1906); Smith v. Bagwell, 19 Fla. 117, 45 Am. Rep. 12 (1882); Chicago
v. Martin, 49 Ill. 241, 95 Am. Dec. 590 (1868); State ex tel. Scobey v. Stevens,
103 Ind. 55, 2 N.E. 214, 53 Am. Rep. 482 (1885); Goddard v. Grand Truck R.
Co., 57 Me. 202, 2 Am. Rep. 39 (1869); Sullivan v. Oregon R. & Nav. Co., 12
Ore. 392, 7 Pac. 508, 53 Am. Rep. 364 (1885); Borland v. Barrett, 76 Va. 128, 44
Am. Rep. 152 (1882); and Brown v. Swineford, 44 Wis. 282, 28 Am. Rep. 582
(1878).
14 Bass v. The Chicago & Northwestern R'y Co., supra note 13.

15 Ibid.

16 Willis, supra note 2.
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plaintiff and are not a matter of right. That is, such damages are within the discretion of the jury, and the jury may arbitrarily withhold them
or award them. Although courts cannot agree whether actual compensatory damages are a prerequisite to punitive damages, a greater
number hold that they are while several courts hold that nominal damages
will support a finding of punitive damages.' Courts have frequently
stated that the amount of punitive damages must bear some reasonable
proportion to the actual damages, but such statements are mere lip service
because practice has shown that punitive damages greatly in excess of
the compensatory damages have been sustained.- 9
A brief look at the punitive damages awards in a few cases points up
the ridiculous nature of any attempted compensatory justification. A pet
Dachshund and the resulting mental distress of the owner were compensated for at $2,000 with an additional $1,000 windfall to plaintiff in
punitive damages. 20 $100,000 seems rather ludicrous compensation for
the discomfort of being shot in the buttock and questioned by plainclothesmen in a mistaken identity case.2 1 And $30,000 likewise overcompensates an improperly discharged employee for fainting spells and loss
of weight requiring medical attention.2 2 Consider plaintiff's windfall in
an award of $675,000 ($175,000 actual damages and $500,000 punitive)
against the drug manufacturer in an MER/29 case. 23 If deterrence is the
prime consideration, it would seem that the compensatory award alone
is sufficient to accomplish this result.
AN ANOMALOUS DOCTRINE
The concept of punishment or of discouraging other offenses does not
enter in the field of torts with the exception "in the one rather anomalous
17 Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co. v. Rector, 104 Ill. 296 (1882);
Petrey v. Liuzzi,
76 Ohio App. 19, 61 N.E.2d 158 (1945); Hodges v. Hall, 172 N.C. 29, 89 S.E. 802
(1916); and Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Logan's Adm'x 178 Ky. 29, 198 S.W. 537
(1917).
i Cases holding that there must be actual damages are: Richard v. Hunter, 151
Ohio St. 185, 85 N.E.2d 109 (1949); Kroger Groc. & Bak. Co. v. Reeves, 210 Ark.
178, 194 S.W.2d 876 (1946); Martel v. Hall Oil Co., 36 Wyo. 166, 253 Pac. 862,
rehearing denied, 36 Wyo. 166, 255 Pac. 3 (1927); Thompson v. Mutual Ben. H. &
A. A. Ass'n, 83 F. Supp. 656 (N.D. Iowa 1949); and Behymer v. Milgram Good
Stores, 151 Kan. 921, 101 P.2d 912 (1940).
Cases holding that nominal damages will support a finding of punitive damages
are: Scalise v. National Utility Service, 120 F.2d 938 (5th Cir. Fla. 1941); Wardman-Justice Motors v. Petrie, 59 App. D. C. 262, 39 F.2d 512 (1930); and Lampert v. Judge & Dolph Drug Co., 238 Mo. 409, 141 S.W. 1095 (1911).
19Edwards v. Nulsen, 347 Mo. 1077, 152 S.W.2d 28 (1941) (libel, $1 actual and
$25,000 punitive); Livesey v. Stock, 208 Cal. 315, 281 Pac. 70 (1929) (battery,
$750 actual and $10,000 punitive); Seaman v. Dexter, 96 Conn. 334, 114 Atl. 75
(1921) ($318 actual and $5,000 punitive); and Pelton v. General Motors Ace.
Corp., 139 Ore. 198, 7 P.2d 263 (1932) ($225 actual and $5,000 punitive).
20 LaPorte v. Associated Independents, Inc., 163 So. 2d 267 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1964).
21 Bucher v. Krause, 200 F.2d 576 (7th Cir. 1952).
-2Parrott v. Bank of America, 97 Cal. App.2d 14, 217 P.2d 89 (1950).
23 Toole v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., No. 524722, Supr. Ct. San Francisco County,
April 27, 1965.
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respect" of punitive damages. 2"4 But for an understanding of the historical
development of the practice, it would be totally foreign to any system
of justice. Yet such an understanding provides only an explanation for
the existence of the practice in the first instance; it is not a reason for its
continuance. In the words of Mr. Justice Foster, the idea of punitive
damages '"as been suffered to lean upon and support itself by the
supposed weight of
authority rather than to stand upon principle and in5
herent strength."2
So devoid of any basis in reason is the practice that the sole, although
somewhat apologetic, defender of the doctrine, Prof. Sedgwick, in his
work could say of it only that "it is an exceptional or anomalous doctrine,
at variance with
the general rule of compensation; hence that, logically,
26
it is wrong."
AN ANACHRONISM

There now seems to be little doubt that such an award no longer has
any resemblance, in theory or practice, to the original purpose. Punitive
damages grew out of the fact that at early Common Law actual damages
did not include compensation for mental suffering and anguish or other
elements of inconvenience that plaintiff had undergone. Justification of
the doctrine was based on the fact that emotional damages were not
compensable or did not lend themselves to easy ascertainment. When
the courts began to recognize their power to reduce or set aside
enormously high verdicts, they excused their failure to exercise this
power in some cases by referring to the outrage of the case, to the
plaintiff's mental suffering, wounded dignity and hurt feelings, often
doing so in over-zealous and righteous language. No one engaged in tort
litigation today need be reminded that mental anguish and many other
formerly unrecognized elements of damage claimed by plaintiff are now
awarded in his favor. Intelligent evaluation of plaintiff's claim for
damages for emotional distress caused by defendant's conduct is possible
today because of the developments in the fields of psychiatry and clinical
psychology. As this has evolved into the accepted rule, and the original
compensatory role of exemplary damages was thereby filled by actual
damage awards, the courts, faced with an uncertain understanding of
what they were dealing with, and confused by the careless and intemperate obiter dicta of early cases, almost unconsciously began to shift
their emphasis in rationalizing exemplary damages to an exclusively
punitive theory,27 where it now rests.
What had started out as a reason for excusing a jury's improper consideration of'the plaintiff's mental suffering in awarding damages thus
became a rationalization for a result not only intended, but, at first,
not even realized. The courts, by refusing to discard the principle of
24 Prosser, Law of Torts sec. 2, p. 9 (Hornbook series 1955).
Faye v. Parker, supra note 1, at 353, 16 Am. Rep. at 284.
Sedgwick, Damages, sec. 355, p. 699 (9th ed. 1913).
27 For examples of this shifting, see Merest v. Harvey, 5 Taunt 442, 128 Eng.
Rep. 761 (C. P. 1814); and compare McNamara v. King, 7 Il1. 432, 2 Gilman 432
(1845) with Ousley v. Hardin, 23 Ill. 403 (1860).
25
26
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punitive damages when the reason for it no longer existed, created the
28
tiger they now so dubiously held by the tail.
PUBLIC VENGEANCE

UNCIVILIZED

Punishing the defendant for his actions is based upon the satisfaction
of a public desire for revenge. "But vengeance is a questionable objective
for a civilized legal system," one writer recently noted.29
The uncivilized nature of punitive damages becomes apparent when
the practice is silhouetted against the safeguards granted to the defendant in a criminal proceeding for an act in which punitive damages
are awarded. Assume the typical action seeking punitive damages,
complete with the usual allegations of "wanton, willful, reckless malice"
and the like. What the defendant did, or is alleged to have done, either
also constitutes criminal conduct, as proscribed by the jurisdiction's
criminal laws, or it does not.
If the defendant's actions do amount to a crime, then the criminal
court is obviously the arena wherein society's vindication best lies. Whatever the theory of criminal law one selects-punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation-the criminal law with its flexibility in sentencing, the court's
vast experience with wrongdoers, and its staff of parole, probation and
other experts, is best equipped to achieve society's ends. Moreover, if
the allegations are such that the defendant's acts are criminal, he ought
to be afforded the historic and constitutional guarantees normally afforded
one accused of a crime in this country before he is punished for it. His
guilt should be proved beyond a reasonable doubt,30 rather than by a
simple preponderance of the evidence. He should be advised of his right
to counsel. He should be able to refuse to aid in his own punishment
by being granted the right to remain silent rather than being compelled
to give testimony against himself. 31 His punishment should be imposed
by someone knowledgeable and experienced rather than by a body which
has no experience in fixing penalties. His punishment ought to be guided,
or at least limited, by the law, rather than by the whimsy of a jury's
discretion.32 Evidence admitted concerning the defendant's financial
position for the purpose of determining effective "punishment," evokes
irrational jury prejudices, 33 and the defendant should not be subject to
the largely unchecked discretion of the jury due to extremely limited
appellate review of such awards. 34 Since punitive damages may be as28 For a detailed examination of the history of punitive damages see Hale, supra
note 2, and Greenleaf, supra note 2.
29 Note, 70 Yale L. J. 1296, 1298 (1961).
30 Spokane Truck & Dray Co. v. Hoefer, supra note 4, at 1074.
31Ibid.
32 Morris, "Punitive Damages in Tort Cases," 44 Harv. L. Rev. 1179, 1180 (1931).
33 Most states admit such evidence, 25 C. J. S. sec. 126 (1941). See, e.g. Wilson
v. Oldroyd, 1 Utah 2d 362, 372, 267 P.2d 758, 766 (1954); Nelson v. Halvorson,
117 Minn. 255, 135 N.W. 818 (1912).
34 The discretion of the jury in awarding exemplary damages is much broader
and freer than its discretion in awarding compensatory damages. See, Thomas v.
Mickel, 214 Miss. 176, 58 So. 2d 494 (1952); Scott v. Times-Mirror Co., 181 Cal.
345, 367, 184 Pac. 672, 681 (1919). See also, McCormick, Damages see. 77 (1935).
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sessed against a defendant who is also amenable to' 5criminal prosecution,
he may be effectively subject to "double jeopardy."
If the actions of the defendant do not constitute a crime, he then
simply should not suffer punishment. Thus, if the defendant's conduct
has not been of such a character to invoke society's penal sanctions, if
the community has not previously seen fit to call for punishment of such
acts, then there is clearly no reason why a given jury may (or may not,
as their sole discretion dictates) in an emotion-ridden courtroom enact
and enforce punitive measures on an ad hoc basis. Since compensatory
damages themselves have a punitive effect,36 additional punishment is
clearly uncivilized. If the compensatory damages are not sufficient to
deter defendant from future actions, plaintiff can go into equity and ask
for injunctive relief. Failure to comply with an injunction then signals
contempt proceedings and the defendant can be fined or jailed if in the
wisdom of the court,'3 it is found necessary.
DETERRENT EFFECT PURELY FICTIONAL

The last plausible basis advanced for retaining punitive damages is
that it has some unknown deterrent effect on the plaintiff and third
parties.3 8 Yet this rationalization is strictly in the realm of fiction. Few
persons, if any, have any knowledge and understanding of what punitive
damages are, yet they are quite aware of criminal sanctions against acts
for which they could be held liable in punitive damages. In most instances compensatory damages alone are sufficient to deter individuals
39
from such acts.
If comparative studies were conducted in those states which do not
recognize punitive damages and in those states which do, findings would
not reveal that the former are centers harboring the malicious, the wanton
and the grossly negligent. Frequency of occurrence and recidivism would
be no greater in Massachusetts, Nebraska, Louisiana and Washington
than in the other states of the Union. Thus the vague public policy of
granting punitive damages because of its deterrent effect is not supported
by any empirical facts.
COLLATERAL CONFUSION

The shallow basis for recognizing the doctrine of punitive damages
causes breaches of construction and confused interpretations when it
is construed and applied to collateral legal areas. For example, compensatory damages have long been assessed against corporations and
other entrepreneurs for the negligent conduct of their employees without
regard to the culpability of owners or responsible managerial agents.
But the deterrent purpose of the doctrine would exempt the master and
3-McCormick, Damages sec. 77 (1935); Aldridge, "The Indiana Doctrine of
Exemplary Damages and Double Jeopardy," 20 Ind. L. J. 124 (1945).
36 Morris, supra note 32, at 1188.
37 See, Funk v. H. S. Kerbaugh, 222 Pa. 18, 70 Atl. 953 (1908).
38 Supra note 29, at 1298.
39 Morris, supra note 36.
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the corporation from punitive damages for malicious torts of servants
or agents unless in some way the malice of the servant or agent could be
attributed to the master or the corporation.4 0 There is no justification
for extension of liability without fault due to already adequate compensation awards, and since the effect of such liability on deterrence
and prevention is, at best, highly uncertain, there is no need for assessment of punitive damages against the nonculpable employer."'
The general rule with respect to the vicarious liability of the private
employer applies with equal justification to municipalities. An additional
basis for rejecting awards of punitive damages against the municipality
exists in that the public would be forced to pay a private individual,
who has been adequately compensated, a "windfall" simply because of
the nature of the municipal employee's act. In this area, as with private
business, intra employer-employee relations with respect to deterrence
and prevention have no effect on the adequate compensation of plaintiff.
By placing this liability on the private business and the municipality,
suits would be encouraged whereas if the individual employee alone
were liable, lesser awards, more closely related to actual damages,
would be the result.
A third area of confusion is in the field of insurance. The initial determination must be made whether the policy provisions exclude coverage, and if not, whether public policy permits coverage. The majority
of decisions have held that punitive damages are covered in the typical
automobile liability policy.42 Yet the majority of legal writers seem to

espouse the opposite result. "It would seem," states one author, "that insurance against exemplary damages frustrates their purpose and should
3
be considered contrary to public policy.""
A trend to accept this
4
reasoning by the courts has already begun. 4
The deterrent effect of punitive damages is negated in large measure
upon a determination that for a slight increase in premium coverage can
be obtained. It is no answer to say that the risk to the insurer is not
oppressive and should be considered a risk of doing business, since the
insurer has no part in the acts of the insured and no control over them.
CURRENT ABUSES IN

PRACTICE

Punitive damages are now part of the arsenal of plaintiffs' attorneys
to achieve the "more than adequate award." 4 5 The altruistic and unrealistic purpose of the doctrine is revealed when the punitive damage
40 Wickem, "The Rule of Exemplary Damages in Wisconsin," 2 Wis. L. Rev. 129,
153 (1923).
41 70 Yale L. J. 1296 (1961).
42
Brin, "Punitive Damages And Liability Insurance," 31 Ins. Counsel J. 265, 269
(1964).
43 Damages To Persons And Property, sec. 275C, p. 560 (1961).
44 Northwestern National Casualty Co. v. McNulty, 307 F.2d 432 (5th Cir. 1962).
45 The slogan "more than adequate award" is taken from the words of Mr.
Justice Schroeder of the Kansas Supreme Court in Caylor v. Atchison, Topeka &
Santa Fe R.R. Co., 190 Kan. 261, 374 P.2d 53 (1962) when he said that the phrase
"the more adequate award" is a "synonym, to all but the naive, for 'the more than
adequate award'."
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practice as it is developing is disclosed. A plaintiff. "doesn't want to know
the history of the law or the forms of actions. He wants to know how
much he is going to get for his injury, 'How much am I entitled to?' I am
entitled to special damages. I am entitled to general damages, and, in
an aggravated tort in this country, I am entitled to punitive damages." 6
In order to satisfy the insatiable appetite for the larger and larger jury
verdict, the punitive damage practice opens new doors heretofore unexploited. As summed up by one47plaintiff's attorney, "the punitive field
has been completely overlooked."
Pleading "wantonness or wilfulness" will allow the plaintiff's attorney
to "get rid of contributory negligence"
as a defense, and to abolish the
4s
defense of "last clear chance."
Another plaintiff's attorney has exposed the trial tactics which are
going to be used to fully exploit the practice when he said:
One of the most important parts in alleging facts to warrant punitive
damages is that many cases allow you to show financial wealth of the
defendant. If you're entitled to go to the jury on damages. that are punitive,
the courts have held that the wealth of the defendant is material because
what might be punishment to a man9 of modest means would be no punishment at all to one of great wealth.4

As early as 1923 Justice Wickem of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
recognized possible abuses in this area when he stated: "In theory, the
rule permitting the wealth of defendant to be shown as a basis for
exemplary damages is correct; in practice, one suspects that evidence
that defendant is a person of large property holdings tends unduly to
prejudice the jury upon the merits of the case and the amount of compensatory damages."5°
Consider also the amendment of the ad damnum tactic. The effective
use of this advice was noted in a case where the original pleading seeking
$350,000 in compensatory damages, was amended to claim an additional
$500,000 in punitive damages. The jury awarded the latter amount in
addition to $175,000 compensatory damages.51 Maneuvering such as this,
with court approval, is effective in convincing the jurors that a finding
of a lesser amount than that originally claimed simply would not be
justified, even though plaintiff is otherwise adequately compensated.
The plaintiff's attorneys are now using punitive damages expressly for
the purpose of building damages for the claimant rather than for the
purpose of punishing or deterring the defendant.
The effect of the present day punitive damages theory is to encourage
litigation. Plaintiffs bring suit to recover more than compensatory
damages, thus giving rise to appeals after the jury's arbitrary determination of the amount of the award. Determination of the amount and
the propriety of the award is based on unrelated trivia such as the
46 Trial and Tort Trends (1962), p. 7.
47 Ibid.

48 Id. at 8.

49 Id.at 57.
50 Wickem, supra note 40, at 155.
51 Supra note 23, 8 A. T. L. A. Newsletter 135.
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wealth of the defendant, insurance policy coverage provisions, and nonfault concepts with respect to employers. These considerations have no
relationship to compensation of the plaintiff for injury, in effect they
merely add to the already adequate compensatory damages.
The general rule appears to be that the court will not set aside as
excessive an award of punitive damages except in extreme cases where
it appears to be the result of either passion, prejudice, or improper
sympathy, or it appears that an injustice has been done.52 There are few
cases in which the court will interfere with a jury's award of punitive
damages as excessive. 3 Consider the court's obligation where the jury
awarded $1 actual damages and 1.5 million dollars as punitive5 4 damages
resulting from plaintiff's exasperation with telephone service.
CUMULATIVE OBJECTIONS

Each objection to the punitive damages doctrine and practice becomes
cumulative. Those criticisms of the concept which were voiced by many
jurisdictions when the doctrine was first adopted in this country are as
valid now as they were when raised. But as the doctrine developed, more
and more serious objections to it became apparent. The use of punitive
damages in civil litigation is an outmoded doctrine inimical to the
interests of the public and should be interred in the "limbo" of jurisprudence.
52 15 Am. Jur. Damages sec. 297, p. 738 (1962).
53 62 A.L.R.2d 839, 843 (19
).
54 News Release, Milwaukee Sentinel, June 23, 1965.

